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Abstract: In the information era, the core business and confidential information of 
enterprises/organizations is stored in information systems. However, certain malicious 
inside network users exist hidden inside the organization; these users intentionally or 
unintentionally misuse the privileges of the organization to obtain sensitive information 
from the company. The existing approaches on insider threat detection mostly focus on 
monitoring, detecting, and preventing any malicious behavior generated by users within an 
organization’s system while ignoring the imbalanced ground-truth insider threat data 
impact on security. To this end, to be able to detect insider threats more effectively, a data 
processing tool was developed to process the detected user activity to generate information-
use events, and formulated a Data Adjustment (DA) strategy to adjust the weight of the 
minority and majority samples. Then, an efficient ensemble strategy was utilized, which 
applied the extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost) model combined with the DA strategy to 
detect anomalous behavior. The CERT dataset was used for an insider threat to evaluate our 
approach, which was a real-world dataset with artificially injected insider threat events. The 
results demonstrated that the proposed approach can effectively detect insider threats, with 
an accuracy rate of 99.51% and an average recall rate of 98.16%. Compared with other 
classifiers, the detection performance is improved by 8.76%. 
 
Keywords: Insider threat, data adjustment, imbalanced data, ensemble strategy. 
1 Introduction 
Nowadays, with the rapid development of networks, many enterprises/organizations have 
set up their own inside network. Although the inside network has facilitated the work and 
the management of the organization, the network security incidents are happening more 
and more frequently and becoming more serious. Recent reports have shown that 90% of 
the organizations feel vulnerable to insider attacks. The main enabling risk factors 
include too many users with excessive access privileges (37%), the increasing number of 
devices with sensitive data access rights (36%), and the increasing complexity of 
information technology (35%) [Crowd Research Partners (2019)]. 
Insider threat-related activities mainly come from within the organization and pose a 
threat to the organization itself, such as involving current or former employees, 
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contractors, or partners who have or have authorized access to the organization’s 
networks, systems, or data and abuse the access rights. But in most cases, users ignore the 
form of “unintentional” insider threats. For example, when a user accidentally sends an 
email containing sensitive information to the wrong recipients. Although users do not 
intend to conduct potential threats, their actions may indeed have serious consequences 
for the company, and may even cause the same damage as “intentional” insider threats. 
Similar insider threats with “malicious intentions” are usually submerged in massive 
amounts of normal data, and any proposed system for insider threat detection needs to 
overcome the challenges in learning from the highly imbalanced data of heterogeneous 
sources in order to distinguish malicious activities from the legitimate ones, all of which 
are from authorized users. 
Therefore, to be able to detect insider threats more effectively, a data processing tool was 
developed to process the detected user activity to generate information-use events and 
formulated DA strategy to adjust the weight of the minority and majority samples. Then, 
an efficient ensemble strategy was utilized, which applied the XGBoost [Chen, He, 
Benesty et al. (2015)] model combined with the DA strategy to detect an insider threat. 
The insider threat dataset (see Tab. 1) was used to evaluate the proposed approach, which 
contains multiple types of insider threat scenarios and is specifically used for insider 
threat detection system evaluation. The results showed that the proposed ensemble 
strategy was effective in insider threat detection; this is of practical significance to the 
detection of insider threats in organizations. 
2 Related work 
In the field of internal threat detection, the current research on this issue has attracted the 
attention of many government organizations and security companies. Many researchers 
have proposed various solutions to detect attacks from inside network users within 
organizations. Hunker et al. have presented an overview of the definition of insider 
threats and discussed some approaches from the domains of technology, sociology, and 
social technology [Hunker and Probst (2011)]. Their main conclusion was that dealing 
with insider threats requires combining technologies from these domains to detect and 
mitigate insider threats. Many insider threat detection systems are derived from DARP’s 
ADAMS project [Thompson, Stolfo, Keromytis et al. (2011); Le and Zincir-Heywood 
(2018); Eldardiry, Bart, Liu et al. (2013); Rashid, Agrafiotis, Nurse et al. (2016); Gavai, 
Sricharan, Gunning et al. (2015); Goldberg, Young, Reardon et al. (2017)], which aimed 
to identify patterns and anomalies in large datasets to address insider threats. Le et al. [Le 
and Zincir-Heywood (2018)] proposed an unsupervised self-organizing graph learning 
algorithm for distinguishing normal user and malicious user activities. Eldardiry et al. 
[Eldardiry, Bart, Liu et al. (2013)] proposed an approach to use a hybrid anomaly 
detector to detect anomalous changes from information combined from multiple domains 
(user activity).  Rashid et al. [Rashid, Agrafiotis, Nurse et al. (2016)] applied the hidden 
Markov model (HMM) to model a user’s weekly activity sequence and detected possible 
insider threats from subtle changes. Gavai et al. [Gavai, Sricharan, Gunning et al. (2015)] 
used different approaches based on machine learning to construct user activity data under 
specific threat scenarios for insider threat detection. Goldberg et al. [Goldberg, Young, 
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model to organize user activity log data to identify insiderl threat indicators. 
An online unsupervised deep learning approach is proposed to detect anomalous network 
activity in the system logs in real time [Tuor, Kaplan, Hutchinson et al. (2017)]. The model 
decomposed the anomaly score into the contribution of individual user behavior features to 
improve the security analysts’ review of potential insider threat activities. In order to detect 
insider threats from complex audit data, Liu et al. [Liu, DeVel, Chen et al. (2018)] proposed 
an anomaly detection system based on a deep autoencoder. Each autoencoder was trained 
using a specific category of audit data that accurately represented the employee’s normal 
behavior. Azaria et al. [Azaria, Richardson, Kraus et al. (2014)] presented a framework for 
insider threat (BAIT) behavior analysis, and they conducted detailed experiments on 795 
subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to assess real human subjects when 
attempting to exfiltrate data from within the organization. In the real world, the number of 
actual insiders found is very small [Luo, Wang, Cai et al. (2019)]; therefore, the approach 
of machine learning has encountered challenges. 
It can be clearly observed from these related works that the insider threat of the 
enterprise/organization is the result of a range of abnormal activities caused by the inside 
network users with malicious intentions abusing the organization’s resources. As a result, 
a small number of malicious activities are embedded in a large amount of normal activity 
data. How to detect malicious activity behavior from imbalanced ground-truth insider 
threat data is a significant challenge in current machine learning. Therefore, we propose 
an ensemble strategy for insider threat detection from user activity logs to address this 
problem. The main contributions are as follows: 
(1) In this study, a data processing tool was developed to address the activity log data to 
represent user behavior and formulated a DA strategy to optimize imbalanced data. 
(2) Combining the advantages of the XGBoost model and the DA strategy, this paper 
constructed an ensemble strategy to detect insider threats. 
(3) The results demonstrated that the proposed approach can effectively detect insider 
threats, with an accuracy rate of 99.51% and an average recall rate of 98.16%. Compared 
with other classifiers, the detection performance is improved by 8.76%. 
3 System overview 
An overview of the proposed novel ensemble strategy for insider threat detection from user 
activity logs is shown in Fig. 1. The log data collection, data processing, and feature 
extraction steps of the inside network users of the organization are detailed in Section 3.2. 
The next step is to use DA strategies to optimize imbalanced data as described in Section 3.4. 
In Section 3.5, we present an ensemble strategy, which combines the strengths of the 
XGBoost model and the DA strategy to detect insider threats. In the experimental analysis 
section, (i) We use the CERT data set as test data, and apply a data processing tool to extract 
feature, such as statistical user email records, access times to log in to the office system, use 
times of external devices, etc. (ii) We construct different insider threat scenarios and 
organize user features as data analysis. The evaluation metrics we use are precision, recall, 
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Figure 1: Insider threat detection model 
3.1 Data collection, processing and feature extraction 
On the basis of the daily activities of the inside network users of the organization, we 
analyzed the behavior of inside network users. Therefore, it is necessary to collect 
behavior information of the users. It was specifically collected log files include web 
server access logs, email server access logs and file server access logs in the organization 
inside network. we use these data is to correlate the information recorded by such activity 
log data to directly or indirectly reflect the user's regular pattern and interest. An effective 
monitoring process combined with adequate data collection can successfully apply 
machine learning techniques and enable security analysts to make the correct decisions. 
Therefore, in this study, we employ the CERT insider threat dataset to validate our 
approach, which is synthesized from the organization's individual server log data. It 
includes login events, device events, mail events, Http events, file events, etc. we have 
processed the dataset to extract data features and provide suitable data formats for 
machine learning algorithms. But in many cases, various types of user data do not 
provide enough features to characterize complete user information. therefore, we need to 
reason about the user's related activity characteristics based on existing data and use it as 
auxiliary information for further processing. In particular, we design and describe the 
user's activity relationship according to the sequence of user activities, such as the user's 
activity relationship in the same department, the number of times the external device is 
used during and outside working hours, the relationship between users accessing internal 
files during normal working hours and non-working hours, working time access website 
category, etc. For instance, in the logon event activity, the relationship <userid, PC, user 
name, date, logon time, and logoff time> was extracted from the log file. In the device 
event activity, the relationship <userid, PC, user name, date, connect, and disconnect> 
was extracted from the log file. In the email event activity, the relationship <userid, PC, 
user name, date, the number of external mails sent per day, the number of inside emails 
sent every day, the number of email attachments sent every day> was extracted from the 
device email file. In the file event activity, the relationship <userid, PC, user name, date, 
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extracted from the log file. In the http event activity, the relationship <userid, PC, 
username, date, access wikileaks.org frequency, key-logger downloading sites frequency, 
job-advertisement related web-pages frequency> was extracted from the log file. After 
obtaining the user attribute-related information, we constructed the daily activity 
information on the basis of the time sequence for each user. 
Table 1: Single-Day features 
Log Type List of Single-Day Features 
Logon difference of office start time from first login time  
difference of last login time from office end time 
average time difference between login times in office hours 
average time difference between login times after office hours 
total number of logins 
total number of logouts 
number of logins outside office hours 
total number of computers accessed  
number of computers accessed outside office hours 
average session time outside office hours 
Device number of times a thumb drive was used outside office hours 
number of times a thumb device was used during non-office hours 
total number of times a device was used  
Http total number of times wikileaks.org was visited 
TF-IDF-based feature for job-advertisement-related webpages 
TF-IDF-based feature for key-logger downloading sites 
File number of times decoy files were copied 
number of times .exe files were downloaded  
Email number of emails sent outside the organization’s domain 
number of emails sent inside the organization’s domain from the 
supervisor’s account 
number of attachments 
average email size 
number of recipients 
Based on the data information obtained in the previous step, feature extraction is shown in 
Tab. 1. In this work, we extract two types of features that characterize the user’s complete 
information from various types of user activity data: (i) statistical features, especially the 
mean and standard deviation of the data, e.g., internal email attachment size, external email 
attachment size, sensitive files size, or the number of keywords in the recruitment website 
visited, and (ii) frequency features, counting the number of user activities within a certain 
period of time, e.g., the number of user logins and logouts, the number of external emails 
sent, the number of internal emails, the number of accesses to sensitive files, or the number 
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user information to provide the context of machine learning algorithms. 
3.2 Data-adjusted strategies 
In this section, we analyze the outcomes of the pre-processed feature data. The 
distribution of features is shown in Fig. 2. In the class, 0 represents a sample of malicious 
features, and 1 represents a sample of normal features. This figure shows that the ratio of 
malicious samples to normal samples is extremely imbalanced. Machine learning 
algorithms learn from the imbalanced data, and training and detection lead to a high false 
alarm rate, that is, ignore the real malicious behavior. To this end, we propose a DA 
strategy to optimize imbalanced data. 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of normal and malicious sample distributions 
Thus far, many researchers have achieved good efforts in dealing with imbalanced data 
classification issues [Galar, Fernandez, Barrenechea et al. (2011)], such as resampling 
strategies: undersampling, oversampling, and hybrid approaches. The synthetic minority 
oversampling technique (SMOTE) is a synthetic sub-sampling technique. It is an 
improved scheme based on a random oversampling algorithm. However, as random 
oversampling adopts a strategy of simply copying samples to increase the small number 
of samples, it is easy to produce an issue of model overfitting. The solution to Borderline-
SMOTE, is to add small samples of the k-nearest neighbor boundaries [Qu, Li, Xu et al. 
(2019)]. In addition, random undersampling (RUS) is a very simple integrated algorithm 
for imbalanced data sets, which has attracted the interest of many researchers with its 
efficient calculation method. In this paper, we apply a DA strategy, which combines 
SMOTE (for a minority), RUS (for a majority), and XGBoost, which combines the 
advantages of resampling methods and classifiers. Firstly, we present the XGBoost 
algorithm to obtain the malicious feature (MS) sample. Secondly, the RUS algorithm is 
used to reduce the proportion of most types of data samples. Finally, the SMOTE 
algorithm increases the proportion of minority data samples. We extracted two types of 
instances, such as misclassified instances belonging to minority classes (MS+) and 
misclassified instances belonging to majority classes (MS-), The detailed steps are 
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Algorithm 1 Data-Adjusted Strategies 
Input: Training set S = {xi,yi},i =1,2, ..., N+M;Label yi = {0,1},where yi = 0 represents a  
minority   class  and yi = 1 represents a majority  class. 
Output: Optimized dataset. 
1: Let S={xi,yi} divides into majority set MX = {xi,yi},i=1,2,..., M and minority set 
MN={xi,yi}, i=1, 2, ..., N; 
2:IR (imbalance ratios) = N/M; 
3: if IR≥500 then 
4:    n=500 
5: else 
6:    n=IR 
7: end if 
8: Let MX={xi,yi} divided into n non-overlapping subsets; 
9: Each MX subset combined with MN = {xi,yi} to get n data subsets  
Sub = {Subi }, i=1,2, ..., n, where  Subi ={ xi,yi },i=1,2, ..., (N+M/n); 
10: Initialize, MS += {} and MS −= {} is null set; 
11: if (N+M)<3000 and IR>100 then 
12:  Using XGBoost algorithm to extract MS from training samples; 
13: else  
14:    for each i=[2, n] do 
15:       Generate the 10-flod cross validation set Val={Valj}, j=1,2, ..., k from Subi 
16:       for each j=[1, 10] do 
17:           Use XGBoost algorithm to train the remaining nine sets, get MSi,j from Valj by 
XGBoost; 
    18：    end for 
19：     Get MS += {MSi,j+},i=1,2...n;j = 1,2, …,10 and MS −={MSi,j-},i=1,2, ..., 
n;j=1,2,…,10; 
20:       New minority set NMN={MS+,MI} ,NMX={MS-,aMX},a∈(0,1) ; 
21:       Combine dataset S={NMN,NMX} based on NMN and NMX 
22:       According to the imbalance ratio of the S set, the Smote algorithm is used  
to Increase minority abnormal behavior feature data 
23:     end for 
24: end if 
It is an effective learning approach to tackle the issue of imbalanced data in datasets. 
Compared with the SMOTEBoost strategy [Yu, Mu, Sun et al. (2015); Qu, Wu, Wang et 
al. (2017)], (i) SMOTEboost combines SMOTE and boosting algorithms, uses SMOTE to 
increase the prediction performance of a few samples, and uses boosting to improve the 
overall accuracy. The proposed DA strategy is an independent non-iterative process. ((ii) 
SMOTEBoost only uses the update strategy for the misclassification of a few samples, 
and the proposed DA strategy mainly focuses on the misclassification of a few samples 
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3.3 XGBoost model 
The XGBoosting tree is a boosting method based on a classification tree. It is considered 
to be one of the best methods in statistical learning. The linear combination of multiple 
trees can well fit the training data and describe the complex nonlinear relationship 
between the input and the output data. First, for n samples and m features, set a data set 
),...,2,1),1,0(,)}(,{( niyRxyxD i
m
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iŷ is the prediction, T is the number of leaves in the tree and yi is the real 
label and. Here w is the weight vector of each leaf node and q represents the structure of a 
single tree. The objective function is given as following: 
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second-order gradient functions. The smaller the score, the better the structure q. 
4 Experiments and results  
In this section, we evaluate the proposed insider threat detection approach and verify the 
performance metrics on the CERT r6.2 dataset [Insider Threat Program Development 
(2017)]. As discussed in Section 4.1, we used the CERT insider threat dataset, which is a 
publicly available dataset for the research, development, and testing of insider threat 
mitigation approaches. In Section 4.2, we describe the experimental setup and parameter 
optimization. In Section 4.3, we discuss the results and the analysis of the performance 
anomaly detection approach. 
4.1 Dataset employed 
The CERT r6.2 dataset consists of event log lines from a simulated organization’s 
computer network, generated with sophisticated user models. We used five sources of 
events: logon/logoff activity, http traffic, email traffic, file operations, and external storage 
device usage. Over the course of 516 days, 4,000 users generated 135,117,169 events (log 
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five insider threat scenarios taking place. For details of these insiderl threat scenarios, 
please refer to the method proposed by Glasser et al.  [Glasser and Lindauer (2013)]. 
On the basis of the original CERT data, we performed the data processing steps to obtain 
the single-day feature data, as described in Section III-B. According to the feature count, 
the pre-processed single-day data had 1092 features. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the 
CERT r6.2 data according to the numbers of normal and malicious users. Obviously, the 
distribution of data samples is extremely uneven, and the malicious data of rare sample 
data only accounts for 0.12% of the single-day data. Additionally, user attribute metadata 
were included. Tab. 2 shows the dataset user activity log attribute statistics. 
Table 2: Summary of the dataset 
Date Range Normal Malicious  
Threat Events 135,117,169 428 
Threat single-day 516 47 
Users 3,995 5 
4.2 Experimental setup and parameter optimization 
To be able to assess the performance of the detection system, we divide the entire dataset 
chronologically into two subsets: training and testing. The training subset (~80% of the 
data) is used for large amounts of data for learning and training, so that we can choose 
different models and adjust the optimal parameters, while the latter subset (~20% of the 
data) is used to verify the test indicators, which is convenient for evaluating the 
generalization performance. Tab. 3 shows the XGBoost model parameters. Our 
predictions were made at the granularity of the user single-day data. according to the 
count of user events on weekdays, we found that the number of days threatening users is 
far less than the original events, and the threat events generated by malicious users are 
usually concentrated in one day or several days. Therefore, we filtered the irrelevant data 
of the relevant days and set the test set to contain 20% of the events, which has more than 
40% of the threat user days. 
Table 3:  Parameters of XGBoost Model 
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4.3 Results and analysis 
In this section, we select the experimental data, which contain a large number of activity 
logs of the daily work of inside network users in the enterprise/organization. These 
activity data imply a variety of common and some unusual abnormal behaviors. The 
purpose of this experiment was to apply the insider threat detection model mentioned in 
Section 3 to identify malicious abnormal behaviors from these activity log data and, 
based on the experimental results, to evaluate the detection effect and detection efficiency. 
Tab. 3 shows the accuracy, recall, and F1-score comparison analysis of the DA strategy 
combined with other baseline classifiers (random forest (RF) and gradient boost tree 
(GBT)). The results proved that the proposed approach was effective in insider threat 
detection with a 99.51% precision at 98.16% recall on average. Compared with other 
classifiers, the detection performance is improved by 8.76%. 
Table 4: Results of DA-based strategy combined with other baseline classifiers (random 
forest (RF) and gradient boost tree (GBT)) 
Classifier Precision Recall F1-score AUC 
RF 96.78% 78.52% 86.69% 85.81% 
RF+DA 97.84% 86.26% 91.68% 89.16% 
GBT 95.89% 74.81% 84.04% 84.08% 
GBT+DA 98.21% 87.75% 92.68% 90.35% 
XGBoost 98.57% 82.92% 90.07% 91.78% 
XGBoost+DA 99.51% 98.16% 98.83% 96.87% 
Fig. 3 shows the significant difference between adding DA-based sampling strategy and 
not adding DA-based sampling strategy. The classifier with DA-based sampling strategy 
can be improved by 1%-8% in precision, recall, F1-score. Meanwhile, DA-based 
sampling showed that XGBoost performance reached 8% at F1-score. According to the 
analysis of experimental results, the XGBoost model combined with DA-based sampling 
strategy shows its outstanding advantages in solving the binary classification imbalance 
problem compared with other classifiers. It not only shows good performance on small 
imbalanced data sets without any preprocessing, but also outstanding on large-scale 
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Figure 3: Metric values of baseline classifiers with DA strategies and baseline classifiers 
 
Figure 4: ROC curve from DA-based strategy combined with other baseline classifiers 
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Fig. 4 shows that the ROC curve performance of the applied DA-based sampling strategy 
was obviously better than that of the DA strategy combined with other classifiers. the 
AUC score was 96.87%. For the CMU Insider Threat dataset, based on different insider 
threat scenarios, we could dynamically adjust the parameters to achieve the best 
prediction effect. 
To summarize, the proposed ensemble strategy could not only improve the accuracy of 
insider threat prediction, but also reduces the number of false positives to reduce the 
workload of security managers. 
5 Conclusion and future work  
In this paper, we have proposed an ensemble strategy for insider threat detection from 
user activity logs. First, we establish a behavior analysis model and study the behavior 
features for insider network users. The features we develop include daily activity logs 
such as user login, email sending, file activity, http access and device usage. We then 
used these features to initial anomaly detection using a K-mean clustering approach: (i) 
we used these features as input to an unsupervised anomaly detection method in order to 
detect suspicious behavior and (ii) we used these features in conjunction with marking 
labels to develop a classifier using supervised classification methods. Then we propose a 
DA strategy to optimize these feature datas. Finally, we have presented a novel ensemble 
strategy which combines DA strategy with XGBoost model for insider threat detection on 
synthetic datasets. 
In the future work, our definition and modeling of abnormal behavior needs further 
improvement. Here is mainly to consider more ehavioral factors in the model, associated 
with more data for abnormal behavior detection. In initial anomaly detection, how to set 
up dynamic cluster parameter problem in k-mean. In the future, we try to consider to 
apply the big data platform performs real-time analysis of large-scale data. 
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